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FROM DEPENDENCE AND POVERTY TOWARD ECONOMIC LIBERATION: The Course 
of the Struggle for Southern African Development Co-operation
By Reginald Herbold Green
SADCC is a free association of sovereign states the work of 
which is implemented on a basis of concensus and with 
emphasis on the national efforts ... it is due to this 
practical approach that we have been able to see so much 
concrete progress since the Maputo conference.
- Finnish Delegate, SADCC Blantyre'1'
It would be impossible for us to pass over in silence South 
Africa's aggressive actions in pursuance of a policy of 
economic des"tablisation directed against SADCC member states 
and against SADCC's programme to increase regional self-reliance 
in transport and communications. The most recent acts of 
terrorist destablisation are ... only the most recent and 
blatant of a series ...
- SADCC Council of Ministers, 2
Blantyre Meeting, November 1981
There can be little doubt that SADCC is shaping up to be a 
much more formidable organisation than South Africa's rival 
confederation of Black-ruled stares. That said, dependence 
on South Africa will continue for the forseeable future.
3- Financial Mail., Johannesburg, 1981
From Maputo to 3 lantyre, and Maseru
As 1982 opened SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference) was an established reality recognised, not merely as 
an institution,^ but as a positive force toward economic change in 
Southern Africa. That view was not merely its own - as expressed 
in the overview paper to the Blantyre SADCC "Southern African 
Development Co-ordination: From Dependence and Poverty Toward 
Economic Liberation".0 It was also held by external co-operatrng 
states,0 bv the press,7 and - significantly - by SADCC's enemies 
in 3 cu th Af r i ca.
For this view there was and is considerable justification. From
the first ideas toward SADCC in 1978 to the Arusha SADCC in 1979, the
formal founding declaration at the Lusaka Summit in 1980 to the
0
Maputo and Blantyre SADCC's of 1980 and 1981 has been only four
years. In that time SADCC has acquired nine member states, an
9agreed statement of purpose, a programme of action based on an
evolving body of analysis and e x p e r i e n c e , a n  institutional
structure^ long on programme and consultation and short on bureau-
12cracy, a number of projects in hand and substantial external
13 14support - as well as implacable South African hostility. Very
few regional co-ordination groupings have moved as fast, with so
few internal strains,^ and with a similar degree of cautious
confidence and determination in respect to the future.^
SADCC itself has published three volumes covering its history:
17 18Southern Africa Toward Economic Liberation, SADCC 2 - Maputo
19and SADCC - Blantyre . A  listing of its meetings and programmes
and of bilateral ones associated or among its member states in SADEX^0
21in mid-1981 already ran to 18 pages.
2 2South Africa - whose constellation strategy lies in ruins regionally
23and has been turned against domestically in the Buthelezi Report
- views SADCC with growing concern. That concern is evidenced by a
series of economic destablisation efforts largely keyed to damaging
or hampering national and regional transport and food security 
24stregthening. These have been damaging - particularly to
Mozambique and Zimbabwe - but do not seem to have achieved their
purpose whether of blocking regional transport co-ordination, causing
SADCC to seek a truce or splitting the grouping. The damage has
been made good, SADCC's statements (backed by most of the invited
2 3guests of Blantyre ) while measured are firm in calling for
3safeguarding dependence reduction (not negotiating a dependent modus
vivendi with the Republic), all SADCC states stood firm behind the
2 6two condemnations of South Africa at Blantyre.
The progress of SADCC is in several respects surprising. As ccmmen-
27tators regularly note, its economies are diverse structurally,
weak individually, fragmented internally and from each other while
their political economic strategies cover a range from faute de
mieux dependent capitalism through self-consciously nationalist
interventionist capitalism to several approaches toward transition
to socialism. SADCC, therefore, has been built around common
interests (transport and communications,increasingly food security
and potentially industrialisation and mineral development) and a
common concern to reduce dependence on a large, hostile South Africa
- not on any standard free trade area doctrine nor conmon market 
28model. The economies of at least several member states face crises 
of varying - but increasing - severity and even Botswana and 
Zimbabwe's economies are now coming under severe strains linked to 
foreign exchange shortages and resultant domestic budgetary im­
balances/price rises which look distressingly familiar to analysts
29of their neighbours.
SADCC is well aware of these problems. However, it tends to perceive 
of them as opportunities as well as constraints. The common market 
approachs to developing country economic integration has a very poor 
track record; therefore the indentification of a series of common 
interests and a network of co-ordinated national and regional 
initiations to achieve them has a stranger analytical and practical 
justification than the absence of feasibility of a customs union.
The depth of commitment to loosening the ties binding member states
30tincluding the occupied tenth member to be - Namibia ) to South
Africa is far more politically, emotionally and
economic security compelling than a regional trade focus would be.
The weakness of national economies does make resources hard to pro­
vide for new initiatives but it also underlines the need to reshape 
economic development strategy in ways (eg industrialisation, food 
security, transport improvement, specialised knowledge development) 
which require common or co-ordinated action."^ 1
Competitive and Parallel Intiatives in 1981
3 2The ECA backed East and Southern African Preferential Trade area 
moved forward to the signing of its Treaty by nine of eighteen 
posited (or twenty-one potential^) members at the December Lusaka 
Conference. However, with seven or the nine SADCC members (plus 
Madagascar and Seychelles) absent or present but deferring signing, 
this was more a setback than a success. Problems of articulating 
PTA frameworks and approaches to meet the needs of diverse polities 
and economies, and to complement SADCC for its members, appear to be 
less than fully resolved.
However, if the PTA1 s advance was limited, the constellation's decline
was not. Two years after its 1980 floating at Prime Minister Botha-Ls
Carleton Centre speech it had declined (ironically in a speech of the
venue) to a constellation of Bantustans. While bilateral attempts
34to use economic carrots as well as sticks continued, the constel­
lation itself as a rival to SADCC had vanished like a disintegrated 
comet.
Attempts to move toward sanctions against South Africa had an uneven 
year."0 Pressures were kept up by African states and action groups 
in the North. However, the triple veto (presumably potentially down 
to a double veto since the installation of the new French government'.
5continued to protect South Africa from mandatory Security Council 
action. The 1981/32 emergence of an oil glut - at least for the 
next few months and perhaps for two years or more - made the pros­
pects for "da it yourself” oil sanctions engineered by OAU and OPEC
3 6member states less promising. However, South Africa’s increasing 
need to borrow abroad (declining gold, platinum, diamonds export 
earnings and rising defence and related costs) has made her more 
dependent on external borrowing - an area in which pressure on some 
lenders (notably in North America and the Netherlands) has had the 
effect of reducing South Africa's access to funds.
Programme Development 1981 and 1982^
In 1981 the major operational programme area was transport and 
communications. Over the 1980-81 year over 5338 million was committed 
to projects presented at Maputo (5273 million external and $65 million 
domestic finance. Over half the hundred odd initial projects were 
in some stage of implementation by early 1982.
Animal disease - co-ordinated by Botswana - control also moved a 
number of projects into implementation in vaccine production and 
cross-border control schemes. Another group were moving at least 
to feasibility study stage in early 1982.
Food security - co-ordinated by Zimbabwe - appeared to lag in 1981, 
because its initial programme articulation required a series of data 
collection and evaluation exercises. However, by the Blantyre SADCC, 
technical assistance for all had been secured and most had begun 
with completion scheduled for May 1982.
Manpower development - coordinated by Swaziland - progressed toward com­
pleting an inventory of existing programmes and identifying priority areas 
dor joint action including exchange of students . Funding for several tschnica
studies and one institutional expansion project was tentatively 
committed at Blantyre.
Industrial co-ordination - assigned to Tanzania - progressed to a 
second partly complementary and partly more detailed approach to 
programme articulation. 1982 is expected to see several concrete 
project proposals as well as a number of sectoral, in depth study 
terms of reference emerge.
Energy - co-ordinated by Angola - produced a joint ministerial 
position statement to the UN Energy Conference in Nairobi during 1981 
as well as inaugurating data and national energy plan collection.
A first subcommittee meeting was held in February 1982.
Crop research - initially handled by Botswana - seems likely to be 
merged with food security. The rather limited initial International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics report is to be 
discussed in this context and new proposals put to ICRISAT.
Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation was delegated to Lesotho for 
co-ordination at Blantyre and Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry to 
Malawi at Mbababe (Forestry at Blantyre) with an initial meeting of 
officials held in February 1982.
Following a detailed study by Zimbabwe it was agreed at Blantyre thn 
that Zambia should undertake co-ordination in respect to Mining.
A similar exercise to evaluate the possibility ot adding human 
health as a programme area is being handled by Swaziland.
The international and SADCC programme context led to the tabling 
Z anbia's report on a Southern African Development Fund. Zambia is
to conduct further explorations if it believes conditions to have 
become more favourable for its establishment. Security printing
- based on the Zimbabwe security printing plant now under construction
- will be the subject of an official level consultation on completion 
of the facility in 1982.
In 1982 continued progress can be expected in transport, hopefully 
including a start on the key Beira and Neala links in Mozambique. 
Priority is being given to moving into project design and operation 
in Industrial Co-ordination (following an April Subcommittee meeting 
in Arusha) and Food Security (following completion of initial feasi­
bility studies in May).
The major 19 82 SADCC meetings will be Ministerial in Luanda in May.,-. 
Ministerial and Summit in Gaborone in July (marking the opening of 
the secretariat) and Ministerial and Annual Conference in Maseru 
in November. By the end of 1982 each SADCC state will have hosted 
a major conference.
Formal SADCC programmes do not exhaust co-operation among members.
A number of other bilateral projects exist ranging from smelting
3 8Botswana copper-nickel metal in Zimbabwe , through the ongoing
39Mozambique-Tanzania economic commission to the proposed Trans-Kalahari 
Railway* ^ which Botswana now sees as critical to developing its ccal 
reserves, albeit necessarily deferred to Namibian independence.
Toward an Institutional Skeleton
41SADCC has been a remarkably anti-bureaucratic organisation. ” Its 
member states have insisted that programme decisions and action had 
to come first, and shape subsequent institution and staffing and nor
7
institution creation leading to vested programme interests only
4 2loosely linked to state control or concerns.
In 1980 the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission 
was established because the volume of work clearly called for a full­
time professional staff. However, at that point the control secre­
tariat was contimed as two part-time senior Botswana (the central 
SADCC Chairing country) officials plus a supporting London Liaison 
Committee ot SADCC member diplomats and co-opted personnel while 
other programme areas were delegated to co-ordinating states, in 
some cases with sub-committees of member state technical officers 
to meet regularly to monitor and further programme developments.
The 19 81 Salisbury Summit adopted a "'Memorandum of Understanding on
the Institutions of the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
4 3Conference". This reaffirmed and articulated the themes on insti-
44tutions set out in the Lusaka Declaration. The policy side com­
prises a Summit of Heads of State or Government (annual); a 
Council of Ministers of Member States (in practice meeting three 
times a year) and a supporting Standing Committee of Officials 
(meeting prior to Council). Both the Council and Standing Committee 
can (and do) appoint sub-ccmmittees in respect to particular func­
tional programme areas.
Programme institutions include Sectoral Commissions (to date only 
SATCC) and programmes co-ordinated by individual states (now ten or 
eleven with Zambia and Zimbabwe having two each). New programme areas 
can be approved by the Council - as Mining was at Blantyre with 
Zambia becoming the Co-ordinating State following a detailed case 
for the sector1s addition to the Lusaka Programme of Action made by 
Zimbabwe.
9The Summit also created - effective July 1, 1932 - a small central 
Secretariat to be located in Gaborone. In April 1932 the appointment 
of Ambassador Blumeris of Zimbabwe as the first Executive Secretary 
was made. From Arusha through 3lantyre, Lebang Mpotokwane of 
Botswana had served as Secretary General while Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs of Botswana.
The co-ordinating state approach has certain drawbacks. Sane states 
find it difficult to staff their units adequately and to develop 
close information links with their counterparts. While the increasing 
use of technical assistance supporting personnel and specialised 
official sub-committees has begun to alleviate these constraints, 
they do remain. However, there are clear advantages. No programme 
area can be launched unless the Council so decides - and therefore, 
in practice, several states must be keenly interested. Nor can 
a programme be developed unless both the co-ordinating and other 
states give it high enough priority to devote personnel and time 
to preparing for andattending meetings. The caution in creating 
permanent Commissions means that considerable flexibility in pro­
gramme expansion (and in seme cases potentially deletion) has been 
possible at limited cost, including limited controversy among 
members.
The Blantyre SADCC - Stocktaking and Previews
Blantyre was the third SADCC Annual Conference with invited guests.
It was in SADCC's tradition of an annual meeting with outsiders 
to discuss and to invite comment and dialogue, but not necessarily 
to make major appeals for additional funding. Indeed Blantyre, 
unlike Maputo, was not perceived primarily as a resource mobilisation 
exercise but as the Conference Chairman (Botswana Finance Minister 
Peter Mmusi) said in his closing statement "SADCC's first review
10
.i 4 6conrerence.
The tone of the Communique of the Chairman's and Invited Guests 
Speeches and of the group reports on Transport and Communication, 
Industry, Food and Agriculture and Manpower Development indicate that 
fairly intensive review did take place. They indicate that some 
weaknesses - both in terms of SADCC's speed in bringing programmes 
from design to operational stage and in co-operating states in 
delivering pledged personnel and financial resources - were identified. 
On the the whole, however, they suggest that the general view was 
that progress had been,and would continue to be* made.
In two areas dialogue appears to have been fairly intense, albeit
47while SADCC held to a joint position some commentators have
suggested there were differences among the co-operating states and
agencies perceptions. The first was on economic organisation in
respect to which seme guests were apparently perceived to favour
rather simplified free market/private enterprise approaches. Here
48the Chairman commented that all SADCC states "are committed to 
development for the benefit of our peoples" but that different 
situations meant that "the particular means that we use including 
the balance of state, public enterprise, joint venture, co-operative, 
private enterprise and peasant contribution varies." While welcoming 
exchange of experience and suggestions as to how SADCC states might 
enhance the pace of development he stressed "obviously the final 
decision on approaches, policies and institutions rests with our 
people."
SA.DCC' s condemnation of South African terrorism and destablisation 
as well as of the invasion of Angola and continued occupation or 
Namibia^ was supported by "representatives or several invited
11
governments and agencies."^0 SADCC states viewed it as self-evident 
that a development co-ordination grouping must be concerned if 
its non-member neighbours blow up its joint projects and invaded or 
occupied its members. This appeared to them to be a necessary part 
of concern with the ways and means of development. Some press 
reports^1 suggest that not all invited guests shared that view as 
does the use of the word "several'1 in the Communique.
The group reports indicated that the Maseru SADCC in 1982 is likely 
to lay more emphasis on pledging especially in respect to Food and 
Agriculture and Industry, as well as to a second round of Transport 
and Communications projects on which feasibility studies will have 
been completed in 1982.
Destablisation - South Africa's Answer to SADCC
South Africa's moves to destablise SADCC member state economies and
SADCC's efforts to develop food security and transport self-reliance
52have been diversified and sustained. They overlap with broader 
strategic destablisation and invasion approaches to Angola and - at 
a lower degree of intensity - Mozambique and apparent involvement 
in some type of coup plot in Zimbabwe.
There appear to be three focuses: Zimbabwe in general, petroleum 
and agricultural input supplies and transport links from Beira to 
Zimbabwe, Malawi and Botswana. In the case of Zimbabwe, contracts 
for workers in the Republic will not be renewed, railway locomotives 
were withdrawn (since restored) and notice of withdrawal from the 
preferntial trade agreement (now re-opened for negotiation). The 
apparent purposes include deterring Zimbabwe from selective loosening 
of links with RSA and hampering the emergence of a successful, non- 
racial economy on the border of the Transvaal.
Mysterious problems resulting in delayed delivery of petroleum 
products and/or fertiliser have been experienced by at least five 
SADCC states - Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
Apart from reminding them of South Africa's ability to cripple their 
economies, these actions may be intended to hamper food production 
and thus reinforce South Africa's "food power"^ vis a vis her 
neighbours - a power eroded by Zimbabwe's large 1981 maize surplus.
The most clearcut attacks have been on road, rail and pipeline
facilities leading from Beira and on Beira Harbour markers. These
are critical to the routing of Zimbabwean, Zambian and Malawian -
plus potentially Botswana's - external trade. The pipeline - which
5 4is now ready for use despite South Africa's efforts - is key to 
ending Botswana's and Zimbabwe's dependence on South African or 
South African routed petroleum products. Once in operation it can 
be the cornerstone of completely extricating the region (except for 
Lesotho) from its oil supply bondage on South Africa.
5 5SADCC ‘S conclusion on what is happening is crisp and curt:
It would be impossible for us to pass in silence over South 
Africa's aggressive actions in pursuance of a policy of economic 
destabilisation directed against SADCC member states ... We can 
only see these acts as a direct response to the growing success 
of regional transport rehabilitation..
Constellation in Disintegration
In one sense P.W. Botha's Constellation proposals were a defensive 
reaction to the pre-SADCC initiatives leading to the 1979 Arusha 
SADCC. In a second they represented a new form of South Africa’s 
recurrent drive for export lebensraum in Africa. In a third they 
were an attempt to broaden unity at heme by wooing businessmen and 
increase security abroad by building a broader, firmer network or 
economic dependence at least as far north as Bangin with Salisbury
The formal launching of the concept at the Carleton Centre in Nairobi
in 1979^7 also marked its high noon. Always critically dependent
58on a "Smithorewa solution” in Zimbabwe, it was gravely weakened by
the ZANU(PF) triumph. The success of SADCC - and RSA's own lashing
out to destabilise its neighbours - now appear to have weakened it
past the point of no return. By the 1981 Carleton Centre conference
<Zthe concept of a D velopment Bank was still central to what was still 
called a constellation but now collapsed back to a set of planetary 
Bantustans orbiting the South African sun.
Indeed, by 1980 South African opinion was turning to looking for signs 
of splits in SADCC^^ and to African trade without flag waving.
Despite occasional efforts to revive international interest in the 
constellation,^ 1981 saw it drop out of sight.
6 2Certainly a defensive South African economic link strategy remains0 
for both strategic and more narrowly economic reasons. Dependence 
on RSA is signiricant for all but two SADCC members, and is profit­
able to South Africa. But it is now a defensive strategy to slow 
down erosion of links, to limit SADCC's success, to preserve profits 
and leverage points - not the forward surge of the united volk- 
business alliance P.W.Botha and Harry Oppenheimer thought they saw 
marching forth from the Carleton Centre in 1979.
Indeed, Anglo American - trusting in its own record of ability to 
give up enough to keep open possibilities for profitable business 
in Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (which it proposes 
to extend to Namibia) was seeking to launch its own "middle of the 
road" proposal accepting SADCC and seeking a loose SADCC - South
Lusaka and Kinshasa as its lynchpins.56
African big business development co-ordination alliance to further
independent state development and to allow acceleration of political
63and economic racial change in South Africa. Like the Buthelezi 
Report this is very much not what the Botha constellation was in­
tended to achieve, even if Anglo's survial, growth and profit logic 
led it to support the one, support the second (Buthelezi) and float 
the third.
The Republic's Economic Problems
South Africa’s own economic position weakened markedly in 1981 and 
early 1982 in ways which made holding on to regional economic links 
more important. Further, even to its external friends - eg, the 
Reagan Administration - appear to have been pressing for more carrot 
and less stick in respect to its neighbours as well as to its block 
majority at home. These pressures have led to some initiatives to 
build or rebuild economic links — especially with Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland.
South Africa benefitted from global economic turmoil so long as it 
pushed up the prices of gold, platinum and diamonds. With high
64interest rates, 1981 saw precipitate falls in all threee prices.
The 1982 RSA balance of payments deficit is likely to be a record, 
despite fairly sharp domestic fiscal and monetary restraint precipi­
tating a return to 1975-76's recession conditions domestically.
This context renders it critical to RSA to hold on to - and it 
possible expand - existing markets for goods and services in SADCC 
states. The turnaround on the Zimbabwe preferential trade agreement 
which RSA first gave notice of interest to terminate and later of desir
6 3 -to renegotiate - probably ewes more to the calculation that it Zimba 
loses exports to it it will cut imports from the Republic than to assert 
USA pressures.
Similarly, the - still somewhat tentative - plans for a railway link
6 6frcm the northern Transvaal through Swaziland to link up with the 
existing line to Richards Bay and Durban seem to relate largely to 
facilitating exports, lowering fuel bills and general transport 
streamlining. They might marginally reduce use of Maputo, but that 
may well not be an immediate objective although in a crisis aver 
access to Maputo the alternative link would be an insurance policy. 
The renewed interest in the Oxbow project in Lesotho turns on South 
Africa's rapidly approaching water crisis^ as the main thrust is 
now diverting part of the headwaters of the Orange River to the 
Transvaal, not on electric power - indeed one of the main power 
using sectors would be coal mining/thermal power generation/SASOL 
to economise on petroleum and Cabora Basa power imports.
Whether these approaches will help RSA maintain dominance is unclear. 
For Zimbabwe a more gradual reduction of trade with the Republic 
with time to manoeuvre is arguably of more value than harm to 
successful, phased disengagement. Oxbow would be the first Lesotho- 
RSA link in which Lesotho had any real hold over the Republic after 
completion (probably one of the reasons for the delay). The railway 
project with Swaziland would - at least if Swaziland was firmly 
liable for debt service on its portion of the line - reduce the 
growing Swazi/Mozambique rail transport co-ordination and sharply 
boost Swazilands' export dependence (including services) on RSA, but 
even it is fairly marginal in terms of reinforcing existing linkages.
15
Sanctions: Probabilities and Imponderables
The Southern African states would bear relatively heavy costs were
6 8sanctions imposed on South Africa. However, a majority support
sanctions on the dual basis of solidarity with Namibians and South
Africans and the increasing cost of South African destabilisation,
6 9subversion and military attacks on them.
The prospects for mandatory sanctions in 1982 are poor. In 1981 
the familiar triple veto in the Security Council barred their 
imposition in respect to Namibia.70 An emergency special session 
of the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for sanctions 
but in slightly ambiguous wording, probably not meeting the test of 
the "uniting for peace procedure" for bypassing the Security Council.71 
In any event, how binding such a resolution is - even on states which 
vote for it - is open to substantial argument which the ineffective­
ness of implementation of general sanctions opposed and ignored by 
both the United States and the United Kingdom (and bn the record to 
date Federal Germany, France and perhaps Japan as well) is open to 
no doubt.
Ironically, the potential effectiveness of mandatory sanctions as 
a means to causing changes in RSA policy was demonstrated late in 
1981 in the Seychelles "rugby team coup attempt" case by South 
African based mercenaries and serving members of the South African 
Defense Forces. When the Republic sought to avoid trying the 
defeated coupsters for air piracy after their return in a hijacked 
Air India plane, the major Western powers threatened sanctions in 
rescect to air services to and from South Africa. Arrests and a 
trial - to date highly embarassing to South Africa given the defense 
case of official pre-knowledge (almost certainly true) and connivance
1/
(looking more than plausible despite the absence of any evident
rational motive on the South African government side) - which
72South Africa clearly wanted very much to avoid have ensued.
"Do it yourself" petroleum sanctions based on cooperation among 
the OAU and major petroleum exporters plus - if possible the 
Netherlands and Norway on the shipping and transhipping side - 
looked plausible when mooted by the OAU in April 1981.73 With 
the late 1981-1982 petroleum glut they no longer seem practicable - 
more exporting states will be happy to follow Brunei in making 
open sales and even more to emulating Oman in seeing and hearing 
no evil about where their oil is going.
However, South Africa's increased external account deficit problems
have focused attention on another area - international borrowing.
In 1977 such loans totalled under $300 million; by 1980 they had
74risen to over $850 million and in 1981 to perhaps £1,500 million 
including Reserve Bank balance of payments support lending, while 
short term bank external liabilities rose, by $2 ,000 million.76
1982 medium term external borrowing requirements appear to be of 
the order of $2,000 million76 plus short term commercial bank 
borrowing of the same order. Reserve 3ank borrowing against 
gold reserves is also likely to be high and in February 1982 
$300 million of IMF stand by facilities were activated.
External borrowing is an area in which opponents of South Africa - 
usually church and trade union based - have had significant success. 
Only the major Swiss and German commercial banks, central banks and 
the IMF are relatively unperturbed about the domestic implications 
of lending to the Republic and its parastatals, while the major
US banks have largely avoided new loans for some years. British
clearing banks while still lending have become more concerned
about the domestic public relations and potential lost deposit
cost while the vicious attacks on the World Council of Churches
7 8following its withdrawal of accounts from the Dresdare Bank,
Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation suggests 
that even in Federal Germany and Switzerland sensitivity to the 
issue may be rising.
PTA - Stalemate or Slow Reformulation
1981 should have seen the conclusion of the over 15 year old quest
to create a broad proto economic zone from the Sudan through
79Lesotho and Mauritius through Angola. Negotiations had speeded
up in 1980 and by mid-1981 the draft provisions which had appeared 
inconsistent with managed trade regionally and state economic 
intervention nationally had largely been moulded into forms 
acceptable to the more radical potential members.
While the artificial exclusion of Rwanda and 3urundi still posed 
problems - not least for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania who had close 
economic links with them, Uganda and Tanzania within an economic 
co-ordination grouping (K^gera Basin Authority) this seemed to be 
an issue soluble after formal launching. The articles of the 
East African Development 3ank had been amended to allow new members 
and facilitate its transformation into a PTA Bank while regional 
central banks had agreed on clearing arrangements.
Therefore, the meagre results of the December 1931 launching 
meeting"0 came as a surprise. Nine states - Ethiopia, Samóla, 
Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Mauritius, Malawi and Zambia aid 
sign. Five - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola and Zimbabwe
participated but withheld signature pending further study. Four - 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Seychelles stayed away. As 
a result the signatories do not constitute a coherent area (except 
perhaps for the northern six plus Mauritius but the PTA is unnecessary 
to strengthen trade where it exists - eg. Kenya/Uganda, Kenya/ 
Mauritius - or promote it where it does not in that sub-region). 
Ratification even by the signatories may, therefore, be delayed 
until a broader range of signatories can be achieved.
In retrospect, four causes can be identified: First, the attempt
to juggle to accommodate both PTA and Southern African Customs 
Union (SACUA) membership for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 
the end proved unconvincing to these states. Second, the absence 
of a waiver clause made Tanzanian accession prior to resolution 
of its East African Community asset/liability division negotiations 
with Kenya (a precondition for opening the land border albeit trade
81with Kenya by sea or air is acceptable to Tanzania) very difficult.
Third, despite a long initial transitional period and softening
of "free market" wording, even the revised draft looked doubtfully
compatible with socialist to the absentee states and perhaps also
to Angola and Zimbabwe. Fourth, and probably most important,
real doubts remained (despite ECA assurances) whether the proposed
PTA provisions were compatible with the commitments entered into
in the Lusaka Declaration founding SACC or with existing bilateral
arrangements. President Nyerere put this point most clearly when 
8 2he said "Tanzania will not be signing the preferential trade 
agreement because the implications of the treaty for Tanzania's 
existing commitments for intra-African co-operation have not been 
adequately studied" - a view Zimbabwe also stated in a more 
cautious way.
Future progress now depends on ensuring that the PTA Treaty
(if necessary by amendment) is seen as consistent with existing
co-operation endeavours - eg. SADCC, Kagera Easin, Mozambique-
Tanzania - which are viewed as critical by their members and as
compatible with managed or socialist as well as market economies.
In principle these are attainable goals - in practice achieving
8 3them in 1982 may prove difficult.
SADCC's External Relations
SADCC is unique in having as its only mandated general meeting an
annual conference with invited external guests to discuss SADCC's
programmes, goals, achievements and problems with the intention of
arriving at greater mutual understanding and ways - not limited to
84funding - of improving its performance. It has laid considerable
85emphasis on full and frank presentations to the SADCC's.
External relations havebeccnre quite variegated - reflecting in part 
SADCC's commitment to positive non-alignment and in part the 
diversity of its member states external links. In general they 
have ranged from correct through productive to enthusiastic.
The Nordic states - probably predictably - have been very firm
SADCC supporters in word, provision of supporting personnel and
8 6commitments of finance. EEC - in advance of some of its members
87has also been an early and sustained supporter. While initial
response by Federal Germany and the UK was rather reserved both 
in fact committed more funds over 1981 than they had pledged at 
Maputo - a distinction they shared with Kuwait. France has become 
more suoportive since the 1981 election while the Netherlands has 
been a consistent supporter as has Italy.
21
The Commonwealth Secretariat, like the EEC, has backed SADCC 
from before the Arusha meeting which was addressed by Secretary 
General Ramphul. Partly consequentially, Australia as well as 
Canada have maintained an interest and made commitments of 
personnel and funds. United Nations organisational family support 
has been fairly high in terms of presentations and attendance but 
perhaps less'evenly so in provision of operational technical 
assistance while the World Bank, despite its affirmation of the 
need for regionalism has not been prominent among SADCC project 
sources of finance. Per contra, China which has not attended 
a SADCC has contributed to projects related to TAZARA rehabilitation 
following natural and Smith made disasters.
The degree and purpose of US support has varied. Some proponents
8 8want substantial increases but the present official position is
for moderate, sustained support, for projects in selected member 
89states.
SADCC has found it difficult to develop working relations with
industrialized socialist economies even in respect to projects in
states - eg. Angola and Mozambique - in which they have substantial
bilateral programmes. Their attendance at the Maputo SADCC was
weak, their subsequent financial support very small and their
90representation at Blantyre negligible.
In three fields SADCC-Co-operating State relations have been 
marked by disagreements. The first is the limitations imposed on
support for projects in Mozambique and Angola by several potential
91funders. These partly turn on US perceptions (more accurately
US government as US corporations do not share them, notably so in
9 2the case of Angola ) of Angela and Mozambique and partly on tne 
two states' choice to data to join neither the Lome Convention
nor the World Bank/IMF axis. How serious a barrier to funding
projects critical to SADCC this is remains somewhat unclear - a 
number of bilateral and package commitments to key transport 
links in both states have been made. However, continued 
challenging of the Angolan and Mozambican choices is a source 
of invitation to them and to several of their partners even 
though the latter have made the opposite choices for themselves.
While financial pledges to SADCC projects have been substantial
9 4(probably over $800 million by the end of 1981 ), firm
commitments to specified uses still were below $300 million by
early 1982 and disbursements well below that. The sharpest
criticisms of this record seem to have come, not from SADCC
95members but, from observers and commentators
Certainly SADCC has made no secret of its need for support -
probably nearly $2,000 over the coming decade in respect to
9 6transport and communications projects, (a less daunting sum 
when expressed as $22 million per country per year including 
domestic finance). But while criticizing some specific problems 
of delay and gaps in funding, SADCC members to date have viewed 
co-operation as developing reasonably well and most problems in 
it as subject to and soluble through fairly amiable discourse.
One area in which SADCC's stance has led to tensions with some
co-operating states is South African oppression and hostility.
In "From dependence and poverty toward economic liberation" an
97uncharacteristically harsh passage states:
'In this situation there are some who are unwilling to 
choose bet?/een apartheid and liberation, aggressor and victim, 
South Africa and the majority rule states of Southern Africa. 
The explicit adoption of such a stance is not helpful. A 
choice has to be made.'
9 3
Or, more colloquially, as a former Liaison Committee Chairman
put it in a paraphrase of a US union organising song "They say
in Southern Africa, there are no neutrals there. You either
"98are a SADCC man or a scab for Brother Boer.
Problems, Potentials, Prospects
9 9SADCC perceives itself as facing five groups of problems: historic 
inheritance, South African destabilisation, the impact of the 
international economic crisis on member economies, and problems 
of building up what it terms "the habit of effective regional 
co-ordination." While other analysts might group them differently 
the only really additional problem cited frequently is lack of an 
overall economic strategy.
The inheritance of economic fragmentation, dependence in general 
and dependence on South Africa in particular limits freedom of 
manoeuvre for SADCC members in the short run. At the same time 
it is one of the basic reasons SADCC was created and - particularly 
in respect to SATCC - the evidence to date is that regional 
co-ordination can help overcome that inheritance and, indeed, 
is needed to do so.
South African destabilisation certainly raises costs and slows 
progress. On the other hand it both underlines the need to 
reduce links with the Republic and hardens resolution to do so.
This is especially true because the strings appended to South 
African carrots are so evident and South Africa’s determination 
that - at least with the larger states and arguably with ail of 
them*00 - the overall pattern of benefits be heavily weighted in 
its favour and patterned in such a way as to make selective opting 
out subject to heavy penalties.10*
The global economic crises of the 1970's - especially the 1979
to date combination of the second oil price explosion and the
joint achievement of stagnation and inflation by industrial
economies - have hit Sub-Saharan Africa especially hard. There
102is disagreement as to causes and cures, but little as to the 
overall record. However, this can be seen as increasing the 
urgency and the priority of transport, food security, industry, 
mining and energy restructuring on a more efficient basis. Here 
the critical challenge to SADCC is to move ahead to concrete 
programmes and visible gains in respect to at least one area 
beyond transport and communications in 1982-83.
National resource mobilisation and management are both hampered 
by the present crises - thus SADCCfs persistence in seeking 
international co-operation. In some areas the costs of joint 
action land its chances of attracting external resources) are 
demonstrably higher than "go it alone" approaches. However, 
SADCC like other priorities of its members is limited and 
endangered by their extreme shortage of resources - especially 
foreign exchange - and, potentially even more, by the immediate 
urgent need/crisis management style of resource allocation it 
sometimes imposes.
The "habit of effective co-operation" requires selecting issues 
and interests which unite (and avoiding or setting aside those 
which divide) and being alert to identify regional possibilities 
when engaged in national planning as well as in ongoing regional 
endeavours. To date SADCC has been remarkably skillful on the 
first point (to assign it all to luck would be naiive) but has 
an uneven - if promising - record on the second. The greatest: 
immediate barriers to consolidation and further acvance seem _c
lie in the still sketchy flows of information among members and 
the limited capacity to design, articulate, discuss and act on 
potential programmes which has to date limited the work in 
several programme areas. SADCC is in fact often its own 
severest critic on these points103 which gives some reason to 
suppose that progress can be made.
The lack of an overall strategy criticism is rather different.
It appears to assume that any integration scheme must be either 
a free market oriented one like EEC or a centrally planned economy 
co-ordinating model like CMEA. SADCC's members - who may of 
course be wrong - have consistently rejected both as inappropriate 
to its contextural situation and needs.
SADCC does have two central strategic themes: reduction of external 
dependence especially in South Africa (a goal not seen in terms 
of autarchy); building up their economies along lines which meet 
the basic human needs of their citizens more fully. The strategic 
operational principle applied to relating these goals to SADCC's 
work has been that of critical common interests, ie. areas in 
which all participating (which can be less than all SADCC member) 
states see a clear benefit to acting jointly rather than severally. 
The most obvious sector is that of transport given that six states 
are landlocked and three actual or potential beneficiaries of 
transit revenues, but the Lusaka Programme of Action, as extended, 
clearly embodies a belief that more exist.
This is, in fact, the only way SADCC can proceed - the fate of 
the PTA countries against a common market approach and CMEA's 
operative pattern requires both planning capacity and centralisatic 
beyond what any SADCC state possesses or appears to seek and a
dominant partner (as divisive a concept as can be imagined in 
this context). However, there is more to the approach than 
making a virtue of necessity - it starts from production (whether 
of infrastructure, knowledge, personnel or bargaining power) 
and sees how Whether) that can be done more effectively regionally 
If so, exchange (whether in the form of trade or not) follows - a 
direct reversal of the trade centered traditional common market 
approach.
SADCC's own perception can be seen in the opening and closing
quotations of "Southern African Development Coordination: From
104dependence and poverty toward economic liberation". The
first from the late President Agostino Neto of Angola declares
"So comes the moment, To Advance Resolutely, To build the world,
which belongs - To all human beings", while the latter from
SADCC's founder, the late President Seretse Khama^0  ^ is reaffirmed
'The Lusaka Declaration and Programme of Action do not 
represent a final achievement. Rather, they constitute a 
beginning. The independent states of Southern Africa have 
chosen to go forward in solidarity and to co-ordinate their 
efforts toward economic liberation. This ia a momentous 
decision with consequences which stretch far into our future. 
A movement has begun which, if sustained, could in time 
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